Coherence and Epistemic Rationality :: Mathematics Science Theories Papers

Coherence and Epistemic tenablenessThis paper addresses the question of whether probabilistic coherence is a requirement of noeticity. The sentiment of probabilistic coherence is examined and comp bed with the familiar notion of consistency for simple beliefs. several(prenominal) reasons are given for thinking rationality does not require coherence. Finally, it is argued that incoherency does not necessarily involve fallacious reasoning. Most work in epistemology treats epistemic attitudes as bivalent. It is assumed that a person either believes that in that respect is an apple on the table, or that there is not, and that such beliefs must be either warranted or unwarranted. However, a little reflection suggests that it is reasonable to have degrees of confidence in a proposition when the available induction is not conclusive. The rationality of such judgments, formed in response to evidence, bequeath be my concern here. Degrees of confidence have mainly been discussed by Bay esians as case of a general theory of rational belief and decision. Bayesians claim that rational degrees of confidence satisfy the standard Kolmogorov axioms of probability1. Pr(A) = 02. If A is a tautology, and then Pr(A) =13. If A and B are mutually exclusive, then Pr(A v B) = Pr (A) + Pr(B).It should be observed that people do not generally assign guide on values to propositions, which is required if their degrees of confidence are to conform to the axioms. Moreover, it is doubtful that an assignment of point values to propositions is usually reasonable, since it seems that our evidence rarely justifies such precision. Such vague degrees of confidence can be treated somewhat more realistically, as interval valued, by associating them with sets of probability functions. For simplicity, I will take degrees of belief here as point valued in my discussion here. The claim that degrees of confidence should satisfy the probability axioms is most often defended by appealing to the so-called Dutch nurse argument, which was first presented by Ramsey in his famous paper Truth and chance. The idea is that degrees of belief that do not satisfy the probability axioms (commonly termed incoherent) are associated with betting quotients that can be exploited by a apt(p) bookie to produce a sure loss. Ramsey held that an agents degrees of belief can be measured roughly by the bets that she is involuntary to accept. If they are incoherent, there will be a series of bets, each of which she will be willing to accept, but which are certain to result in a lowest loss for her.